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Abstract
This paper studies the di¤usion of biopharmaceuticals across European coun-
tries, focusing on anti-TNF drugs, which are used to treat autoimmune diseases (e.g.,
rheumatism, psoriasis). We use detailed sales information on the three brands Remi-
cade, Enbrel and Humira for nine European countries covering the period from the rst
launch in 2000 until becoming blockbusters in 2009. Descriptive statistics reveal large
variations across countries in per-capita consumption and price levels both overall and
at brand level. We explore potential sources for the cross-country consumption di¤er-
ences by estimating several multivariate regression models. Our results show that large
parts of the cross-country variation are explained by time-invariant country-specic
factors (e.g., disease prevalence, demographics, health care system). We also nd that
di¤erences in income (GDP per capita) and health spending (share of GDP) explain
the cross-country variation in consumption, while relative price di¤erences seem to
have limited impact.
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1 Introduction
Di¤usion of new medicines is important for pharmaceutical companies as it increases the
returns on their R&D investments and thereby their innovation incentives. Di¤usion of new
medicines is also crucial for patients as they get access to new drug therapies that might
be more e¤ective in treating their disease. Despite the obvious importance of di¤usion of
pharmaceutical innovations, the existing knowledge is scarce.1
Our paper aims at lling this gap in the literature by exploring the cross-country vari-
ation in pharmaceutical sales. We focus on a group of biopharmaceuticals called Tumor
Necrosis Factor inhibitors, hereafter called anti-TNF drugs, that treat autoimmune dis-
eases such as arthritis and psoriasis. The rst brand, Remicade, was introduced on the US
market in the end of 1998. The second brand, Enbrel, entered the market shortly after,
while the third brand, Humira, was launched a couple of years later. These products are
now global blockbusters with total sales revenues exceeding $20 billion in 2011.2
To study the di¤usion of anti-TNF drugs, we use a data set with detailed sales in-
formation of the anti-TNF brands (Remicade, Enbrel, and Humira) across nine Euro-
pean countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and
Switzerland). Our data include monthly product-level information over a ten year pe-
riod from 2000 to 2009, which covers the rst launch of anti-TNF drugs in Europe until
these drugs have become top-sellers on national markets. The descriptive statistics reveal
surprisingly large cross-country di¤erences. The average per-capita consumption in the
country with highest consumption (Norway) is more than 350 percent higher than the
country with the lowest consumption (Italy). The consumption di¤erences are also large
between neighbouring countries. For instance, Spain has 75 percent higher per-capita
consumption than Italy.
To explore the sources of the cross-country variation, we estimate several multivariate
regression models. Since we have a panel data set with monthly product-level observations
1There are a few recent exceptions, e.g., Jönsson et al. (2008), Berndt et al. (2007), Desiraju et al.
(2004), and Miller and Frech (2004). We return to these studies below.
2These gures are collected from the annual reports of Abbott, Merck, Amgen and Pzer for 2011.
2
across several countries, we can control for time-invariant country-specic factors that are
likely to explain di¤erences in consumption.3 This includes factors such as population size,
health status, health care system, and, importantly, the prevalence of autoimmune dis-
eases. As expected, the estimated di¤erences in per-capita consumption across countries
are much smaller than indicated by the descriptive statistics. For instance, the di¤erence
between the countries with the highest (Norway) and lowest (Italy) consumption is now re-
duced to about 170 percent. However, there are still substantial di¤erences in consumption
across countries that are not explained by time-invariant country-specic factors.
We therefore successively introduce various explanatory variables. First, we include
the number of approved indiciations for each of the anti-TNF drugs. This variable varies
across products and over time, but not across the countries in our sample, since the ap-
provals are EU wide. As expected, we nd a positive e¤ect of the number of approvals on
the average per-capita consumption. Second, we include the price of the anti-TNF brands.
Di¤erences in relative prices across countries might explain the variation in consumption.
We nd that lower prices are associated with higher consumption levels, but the cross-
country di¤erences are almost the same as before. Third, we include income, measured by
the gross domestic product (GDP) per-capita, as well as health expenditures as a share
of GDP. We nd that both higher income and health spending have a positive e¤ect on
the consumption of anti-TNF drugs, but also a¤ect the cross-country di¤erences. Thus,
we conclude that cross-country variation in the di¤usion of anti-TNF drugs is to a large
extent due to time-invariant country-specic factors (e.g, disease prevalence, demograph-
ics, health status, etc.), but also country (per-capita) income and health spending, while
relative price di¤erences across countries have no signicant impact.
As mentioned above, the literature on di¤usion of pharmaceuticals across countries
is scarce.45 However, there are some recent exceptions. Jönsson et al. (2008) o¤er a
3We also control for time-invariant product-specic factors, such as the treatment e¤ects, side-e¤ects,
administration form, that are likely to explain di¤erences in consumption across the anti-TNF brands, as
well as time trends in consumption.
4The empirical literature on cross-country di¤erences in the prices of pharmaceuticals is much larger,
see e.g., Danzon (1999), Danzon and Chao (2000), Danzon and Furukawa (2003), and Brekke et al. (2011).
5There are some studies on di¤usion of pharmaceuticals within countries, see e.g., Berndt et al. (2003)
and Chintagunta et al. (2009).
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descriptive analysis of the sales of anti-TNF drugs in a wide set of countries (also outside
Europe) for the period of 2000 to 2006. They nd large cross-country variation in the per-
capita sales revenues. High-income countries have substantially higher per-capita sales
revenues of anti-TNF drugs than poorer countries, but there is also large variations across
countries with fairly similar income levels.6 Berndt et al. (2007) study the di¤usion of new
drugs across 15 countries and three therapeutic classes (antihypertensives, antidepressants,
antiepileptics) using quarterly sales data over a 12-year period from 1992 to 2003. They
nd substantial heterogeneity across therapeutic classes and countries in di¤usion of new
medicines.7 Desiraju et al. (2004) study the di¤usion of new pharmaceuticals in developed
and developing countries. Using data from fteen countries, they nd that developing
countries tend to have lower di¤usion speed and maximum penetration level compared to
developed countries. They also nd that per-capita expenditures on health care have a
positive e¤ect on di¤usion speed (particularly for developed countries), while higher prices
tend to decrease di¤usion speed.8
The contribution of our study is two-fold. First, we contribute to the particular study of
the consumption of anti-TNF drugs. We do so by o¤ering a detailed, exploratory analysis
of the di¤usion of anti-TNF drugs. The literature on anti-TNF drugs is scarce despite the
fact that these drugs are among the most signicant pharmaceutical innovations in recent
time, especially if measured in sales. We complement the study by Jönsson et al. (2008)
by focusing on the consumption (not sales revenues) of these drugs, and extend their
study by investigating more closely the sources of the large cross-country di¤erences that
are observed. In particular, we use multivariate regression that allows us to statistically
test the relationship between consumption of anti-TNF drugs and several explanatory
6There is also a study by Dalen et al. (2012) on the anti-TNF drug market using Norwegian data. They
nd that changing the funding of anti-TNF drugs from the central government (social insurance agency) to
the public hospital enterprises has a signicant e¤ect on pricing and market shares of the three anti-TNF
brands.
7Berndt et al. (2007) also study the role of promotion on the overall consumption and the relative share
of old and new medicines within a therapeutic class. They nd that promotion has a strong market share
e¤ect within therapeutic class, while the e¤ect on overall consumption is weaker.
8There is also a study by Frech and Miller (2004) that analyse the cross-national di¤erences in utilisation
of overall pharmaceuticals. However, this study is mainly concerned with the impact of cross-national
consumption di¤erences on quality of life and obesity.
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variables (e.g., income, health spending, etc), but also test for the importance of country-
and product-specic time-invariant factors. Second, our study contribute to the more
general literature on di¤usion of new medicines. We focus on more "similar" countries
than in Berndt et al. (2007) and Desiraju et al. (2004), but still nd substantial variation
in per-capita consumption. Our contribution is to demonstrate that the cross-country
variation to a large extent is explained by time-invariant country-specic factors, such as
disease prevalence, demographics, health care system, and that empirical studies need to
account for such factors when analysing di¤usion of new drugs across countries. We also
show that income and health spending are important explanatory variables, while perhaps
somewhat surprisingly price di¤erences seem to have limited impact.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we briey present the market
for anti-TNF drugs. In Section 3 we describe our data and sample, and provide some
descriptive statistics on cross-country variation in consumption, prices, etc. In Section 4
we present the empirical model and report our empirical results. Finally, in Section 5 we
draw some conclusions and make some concluding remarks.
2 The market for anti-TNF drugs
Tumor necrosis factor (TNF) is a cytokine (chemical messenger) that is involved in the
regulation of immune cells by promoting the inammatory responses. If the body produces
excessive amounts of TNF, this can cause several medical problems related to autoimmune
disorders such as rheumatoid arthritis, ankylosing spondylitis, Crohns disease, psoriasis,
etc. These disorders can be treated by using anti-TNF drugs, which reduce the e¤ect
of TNF and, in turn, the inammatory reactions associated with autoimmune diseases.
However, since TNF is a part of the immune system, treatment with anti-TNF drugs can
generate potentially severe side-e¤ects related to infections, blood disorders, and some-
times also cancer and heart failure.
The anti-TNF drugs were introduced on the US market by the end of 1998. The rst
anti-TNF brand to receive marketing authorisation in Europe was Remicade (iniximab),
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which was approved for treatment of patients with Crohns disease a fairly rare disease 
in August 1999 by the European Medicines Agency (EMA). The second anti-TNF brand on
the European market was Enbrel (etanercept), which got a marketing approval in February
2000 for rheumatoid arthritis, which is a much more frequent disease than Crohns disease.
Remicade was also approved for rheumatoid arthritis by the EMA just a couple of months
later in June 2000. The third entrant on the anti-TNF market was Humira (adalimumab).
In Europe, Humira got its rst marketing approval in September 2003 for treatment of
rheumatoid arthritis.9
In Table 1 below we provide an overview of the marketing authorizations by the EMA
for the anti-TNF drugs considered in this study.
[ Table 1 about here ]
We see that the three anti-TNF drugs cover in total seven indications. Notably, the
indication approvals are not completely overlapping for the three drugs. Remicade is not
approved for juvenile rheumatoid arthritis, Enbrel is not approved for Crohns disease and
ulcerative colitis, and Humira is not approved for ulcerative colitis. We also see that the
approvals were given at di¤erent dates to the anti-TNF drugs. For instance, Remicade
was the only anti-TNF drug that could be used on patients with Crohns disease until
2007 when Humira also got an approval for treatment of this disease.
The set of marketing approvals will, of course, a¤ect the consumption of the anti-TNF
drugs. The magnitude of the e¤ect on consumption is likely to be inuenced by the number
of approvals and the prevalence of the disease for which the drug is approved for in the
population. Some diseases are rare, such as Crohns disease, while others are much more
prevalent, such as rheumatoid arthritis. In the empirical analysis, we will make use of the
information on indication approvals when studying the consumption of anti-TNF drugs
9There are now more anti-TNF drugs on the market. Cimzia (certolizumab pegol) got marketing
authorization for rheumatoid arthritis in October 2009 by the EMA (but was refused for Crohns disease).
Simponi (golimumab) was also introduced in October 2009, and is approved for rheumatoid arthritis,
ankylosing spondylitis, and psoriatic arthritis.
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over time. However, the marketing authorizations by the EMA apply to all countries in
our sample, and will therefore not explain cross-country (but only cross-product) variation
in consumption.
Since the introduction of the anti-TNF drugs on the US market in 1998, the sales of
these drugs have increased tremendously. Over a decade, Remicade, Enbrel and Humira
have become global blockbusters. Their total sales revenues globally exceeded $20 billion in
2011. Humira generated the largest sales revenues of the three anti-TNF drugs with more
than $7.9 billion, followed by Enbrel and Remicade that produced global sales revenues
of $7.3 and $5.5 billion, respectively, in 2011.10 The sales are expected to increase even
further in the future, despite the entry of new competing products.
Biologics are often discovered and developed by smaller biotech rms that (if suc-
cessful) are acquired by the large pharmaceutical companies. This is also the case for
the anti-TNF drugs. Remicade was discovered by researchers at New York University
School of Medicine and developed by Centocor Biotech (now Janssen Biotech) a sub-
sidary of Johnson&Johnson. Janssen Biotech is marketing Remicade in the US, while
Schering-Plough (now part of Merck) is marketing the drug elsewhere (except in some
Asian countries). Enbrel was discovered by researchers in the biotech company Immunex,
and is now marketed by Amgen in North America, and by Wyeth (a subsidary of Pzer)
or Pzer itself in the rest of the world (except in some Asian countries). Humira was
discovered through a collaboration between BASF Bioresearch and Cambridge Antibody
Technology, and then developed by BASF Pharma. This drug is now manufactured and
marketed by Abbott Laboratories after the acquisition of BASF Pharma by Abbott.
The three anti-TNF drugs are di¤erent biologics that vary in their treatment e¤ect and
side-e¤ects. Remicade (iniximab) and Humira (adalimumab) are artical (monoclonal)
antibodies that binds and inhibits the action of TNF. Enbrel has a similar e¤ect, but
is instead a fusion protein that function as a decoy receptor that binds to TNF. The
administration of these drugs di¤er. Remicade is given as an intravenous infusion under
the supervision of health care professionals at hospital or some other treatment facility.
10These gures are collected from the annual reports of Abbott, Merck, Amgen, and Pzer for 2011.
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Enbrel and Humira, however, can be injected by the patient themselves at home. The
treatment intensity is higher for Enbrel and Humira than for Remicade. While the latter
only requires about 6 treatments per year, patients would need to take Enbrel and Humira
once or twice per week. In the empirical analysis we will take into account the di¤erences
in product characteristics when analysing the consumption of the anti-TNF drugs.
The anti-TNF drugs are generally prescribed by hospital specialists or specialists out-
side hospitals (rheumatologists, dermatologists, etc.). Primary-care doctors are usually
not allowed to prescribe these drugs. Due to the fact that Remicade needs to be injected
under the supervision of health care professionals, this drug is almost exclusively prescribed
by hospital specialists and dispensed through hospitals. However, Enbrel and Humira are
prescribed by both hospital and non-hospital specialists, and dispensed through either
hospitals or retail pharmacies. Table 2 below o¤ers an overview of the prescribers and
dispensing channels for the anti-TNF drugs in the countries in our sample, as well as the
funding body and level of copayments.
[ Table 2 about here ]
The anti-TNF drugs are very expensive medicines. As we see from the table, the
medical expenses are covered by health insurance with a (close to) 100 percent coverage.
Remicade, which is provided in hospitals, have no copayments, while consumers of Enbrel
and Humira are in some countries exposed to marginal copayments usually associated
with prescriptions outside hospitals. When it comes to the funding body, we notice that
there are some di¤erences across the countries whether this is a public central or regional
government or a private insurance funds.
The countries in our study are Western European countries with fairly similar charac-
teristics along many dimensions such as demographics, health status, health care system,
income levels, educational levels, etc. However, there are also di¤erences across these
countries, as can be seen from Table 2. The Scandinavian and Southern European coun-
tries have a National Health Service with predominantly public funding through general
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taxation and public provision of health care. However, we see that the funding body can
be either the central or regional government.11 The Continental countries have typically a
social insurance system with a mixture of public and private funding and provision. This
applies basically to Germany and Switzerland, but not France, as shown in Table 2.
There are also di¤erences across the European countries when it comes to regulation
and price control schemes. Some countries make use of direct price control through price
cap regulation (Finland, Italy, Norway and Spain), where the price cap is usually based
on international price comparisons. Other countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden
and Switzerland) rely more on indirect price controls through negotiations with the phar-
maceutical companies or the design of reimbursement scheme, such as reference pricing
(interal referencing).12
Finally, the prevalence of diseases varies across countries (and also ethnicities). Epime-
diological studies tend to nd that the prevalence of autoimmune diseases such as rheuma-
toid arthitis and psoriasis are substantially lower in Southern European countries com-
pared to Northern European countries.13 In the empirical analysis we will account for
such country-specic factors.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
We have obtained data from IMS Health14 containing detailed sales information of the
three leading anti-TNF brands (Remicade, Enbrel and Humira) in nine European countries
(Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland).
The data cover the ten year period from the launch of anti-TNF drugs on the European
market in 2000 up to 2009 when these drugs have become blockbusters in almost every
11The study by Dalen et al. (2012) on the reimbursement of anti-TNF drugs in Norway shows that the
choice of funding body (central government or public hospitals) has a signicant e¤ect on the pricing and
market shares of the anti-TNF brands.
12See, for instance, Danzon and Ketcham (2004), Pavcnik (2002), Brekke et al. (2009, 2011), and Dalen
et al. (2011) for studies of reference pricing and its e¤ects on pricing and pharmaceutical expenditures.
13According to, for instance, Chandran and Raychaudhuri (2010) the prevalence of psoriasis in Europe
varies between 0.6 to 6.5 percent. Alamanos and Drosos (2005) report similar di¤erences for rheumatoid
arthritis.
14 IMS Health is a US-based market-research company that provides pharmaceutical and health care
information globally.
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Western country.
The data set contains detailed product-level data for each of the anti-TNF drugs in
each country, including monthly information about sales values and sales volumes for each
anti-TNF product (pack) on the national markets. Sales values are measured in local
currency at ex-manufacturer level, while sales volumes are measured as the number of
dened daily doses (DDDs)15 of each anti-TNF product (pack) sold in each country. The
data set also contains detailed information about manufacturer, product name, pack size,
dosage, and formulation. Hospital and retail sales are reported separately for all countries
except for Denmark and Sweden, where we have only the combined sales.
Based on the data set, we construct the following variables. First, we aggregate the
monthly sales volumes (the number of DDDs) of all packs with the same substance in
each country. This gives us a measure of the aggregate consumption per month of the
anti-TNF brands in the di¤erent countries. In order to compare the consumption levels
across countries, we normalize the monthly sales volumes by country population (per
10,000 inhabitants), so that we obtain the monthly per-capita consumption of the anti-
TNF drugs. Second, we compute the monthly (sales-weighted) average price per DDD for
each of the anti-TNF brands by dividing the sales value by the sales volumes (the number
of DDDs) of all packs with the same substance. For the countries with local currencies,
we convert these unit prices to Euros using contemporaneous monthly average exchange
rates. Finally, we compute the proportion of hospital sales and parallel imports relative
for total sales for each anti-TNF drug in each country. Table 3 below summarizes the
descriptive statistics.
[ Table 3 about here ]
3.1 Entry
As mentioned above, Remicade and Enbrel received their marketing authorization on the
European market by just before and after the year 2000, while Humiras rst approval
15Dened daily dose (DDD) is a dosage measure developed by the World Health Organization. This
measure is based on the assumed average daily maintenance dose for its main indication use in adults. The
DDDs are 3.75 mg for Remicade, 7 mg for Enbrel, and 2.9 mg for Humira.
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was in mid of 2003. The marketing approvals are EU wide and therefore applies to all
countries in our sample. However, the data reveal considerable variation in launch dates
across countries, especially for Enbrel, but also to some extent for Humira. We see from
Table 3 that Enbrel was launched in January 2000 in Norway, France and Switzerland, but
not before mid of 2003 in Denmark and Germany. Humira was rst launched in Norway
in October 2002, while not before July 2004 in Italy.16 However, the launch of Remicade
is in the beginning of 2000 in all of the countries in our sample.
The launch of products on national markets is a strategic decision by the pharma-
ceutical rms. These decisions are likely to be inuenced by regulatory schemes, such as
the reimbursement and pricing of these drugs in the various countries.17 Clearly, delays
in launching of products will inuence the di¤usion of anti-TNF drugs, and might be a
source of cross-country di¤erences in consumption of these products.
3.2 Consumption
If we consider the per-capita consumption of anti-TNF drugs, the gures in Table 3 re-
port considerable cross-country variation. We see that Germany and Italy have the lowest
(overall) consumption rates of anti-TNF drugs with almost 78 DDDs per 10,000 capita per
month on average over the period 2000-2009. Norway has, by far, the highest consump-
tion rate with 375.6 DDDs per 10,000 capita per month. This is more than four times
the consumption of Germany and Italy. Interestingly, there are large variations between
neighbouring countries. For instance, the consumption in Norway is 85 percent higher
than in Denmark, and the consumption in Spain is 77 percent higher than in Italy.
If we compare the consumption of each of the three anti-TNF drugs, we see that
Remicade has the highest consumption rate (market share) in all countries except for
Germany, where Enbrel has a slightly higher level. The consumption rates of Enbrel and
16Note that the rst marketing approval of Humira by the EMA was in September 2003. The reason we
observe sales of Humira before that date in Norway is due to the fact that hospitals may start using these
drugs before the actual approval date.
17See, for instance, the studies by Danzon et al. (2005) and Kyle (2007) who nd that countries with
strict price control have fewer launches of new drugs, and that pharmaceutical companies tend to delay
launch into price-controlled markets.
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Humira vary across countries. In Denmark, Finland, Germany and Switzerland, Humira
has a higher consumption level than Enbrel, wheras the opposite is true in the rest of the
countries.
Since we have monthly data for the ten year period 2000-2009, we can study the
di¤usion of the anti TNF drugs in the various countries. This also allows us to take a
closer look at how the late entry of Humira a¤ects the sales of Enbrel and Remicade. The
gure below plots the monthly average consumption (in DDDs) per 10,000 capita for each
brand in each country.
[ Figure 1 about here ]
We see that the three anti-TNF brands have experienced a signicant growth in con-
sumption in all countries. The consumption growth is particularly strong in the Scan-
dinavian countries. In almost every country, Remicade has the highest consumption per
capita throughout the period. Indeed, in Norway the monthly consumption of Remicade
per 10,000 inhabitant exceeds 300 DDDs by the end of 2009.
Interestingly, Humira quickly achieves a high consumption level after its late entry.
However, the consumption growth of Remicade and Enbrel continues in all countries.
This illustrates that the anti-TNF market is expanding over the period. Humira is not
just "stealing" patients from Enbrel and Remicade, but contributes to increasing the
market size for the anti-TNF drugs. We will analyze the di¤usion of anti-TNF drugs more
carefully in Section 4, but rst we take a closer look at the pricing of these products in
the di¤erent countries.
3.3 Pricing
The anti-TNF drugs are very expensive. In Table 3 we report the average price per DDD
for each product in each country. We see that the average price of Remicade is considerably
lower than Enbrel and Humira in all countries. In many countries Remicade is almost 50
percent cheaper per DDD than Enbrel and Humira. The average price of Enbrel and
Humira are almost the same in most countries, except for in Germany, France and Spain
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where Humira has a slightly higher average price.
This price variation across brands are likely to be due to di¤erences in product char-
acteristics. The three anti-TNF brands di¤er in their treatment e¢ cacy and side-e¤ects,
as well as the set of indications that they are approved for. Importantly, these drugs
also di¤er in the administration. Remicade requires injections administrated by health
personnel usually at hospital facilities, while Enbrel and Humira can be administrated by
the patients themselves at home. This can be one reason for the lower price on Remicade
compared to Enbrel and Humira.
More interestingly, we observe that there are considerable price di¤erences across coun-
tries for the same product. For instance, the average price per DDD of Humira varies from
e 34.36 in Italy to e 52.82 in Germany. The average price of Enbrel also di¤er consider-
ably, while cross-country price variation of Remicade is much smaller. Germany tends to
be the high-price country. This is also consistent with the fact that we observe parallel
imports for this country only, with the exception of Enbrel in Sweden. Italy, on the other
hand, tends to be the low-price country.
Let us also take a look at the development in prices over time. Figure 1 below reports
the monthly average price per DDD (in Euros) for each of the anti-TNF brands in each
country over the period 2000-2009.
[ Figure 2 about here ]
We see that the prices are fairly stable in most countries. The gure conrms that
Remicade is priced lower than the two competing anti-TNF brands in every country. We
also see that Humira enters the market with a price equal to or sometimes even higher
than Enbrel. This pricing strategy reects that Humira is perceived to be of same quality
than Enbrel, but of higher quality than Remicade.
How do the pricing of Remicade and Enbrel respond to the entry of Humira? In
Denmark and Italy we cannot spot any price responses. In Finland and Norway there
seem to be some price reductions (competition) taking place after the entry of Humira,
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while, in France and Germany, the price of Enbrel is in fact increasing after the entry.
The price of Humira is gradually reduced, and the two prices eventually converge in these
two countries.
As mentioned in the previous section, the prices of the anti-TNF drugs are not set freely
by the pharmaceutical rms, but are subject to price control mechanisms or negotiations
with payers in the di¤erent countries. Thus, price changes can be induced by regulations
or through re-negotiations. This is also likely to explain parts of the di¤erences in price
levels and developments across countries. However, pharmaceutical companies can also
make (especially downwards) adjustments of the pricing of their products. In any case,
the prices of the anti-TNF drugs are likely to inuence the di¤usion, which we will take
into account in the empirical analysis in the next section.18
4 Empirical method
We now proceed by analyzing the potential sources of cross-country variation in the con-
sumption of the anti-TNF drugs. Since we have a product-level panel data set with
detailed sales information of the three anti-TNF brands over ten years (120 months) in
nine countries, we are able to control for all product- and country-specic factors (both
observed and unobserved) that are time invariant. We start by estimating the following
multivariate regression model:
lnYcit = 1 lnPcit + 2 lnGDPct + 3HEct + 4Iit (1)
+i + c + 1 ln t+ 2Qt + "cit;
where the dependent variable (lnYcit) is the (natural logarithm of) consumption per
(10,000) capita of product i in country c at time t. In the regression, we include dummy
variables to capture product- and country-specic e¤ects. The product-specic e¤ects (i)
18The study by Desiraju et al. (2004) shows that the di¤usion speed is lower in countries with high prices.
However, we may also expect that high price levels imply quicker launch (less delay) of new products, as
found by Kyle (2007).
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capture characteristics of the anti-TNF drugs that are constant over time and common
across countries. The di¤erent brands are separate biological substances that have di¤er-
ent properties in treatment. One brand might be more e¤ective in treating some patients
(or diseases), while less e¤ective for others. The brands also di¤er in their side-e¤ects, and
for this reason could be more suitable for some patients (or diseases), while less suitable
for others. The product-specic e¤ects also include properties of the drug treatment like
the fact that the use of Remicade requires assistance by health personnel, whereas Enbrel
and Humira can be administrated by the patients themselves at home. In the regressions,
we use Remicade as the reference product.
The country-specic e¤ects (c) capture all characteristics of national markets that
are constant over time and common across the products, such as market (or population)
size, health status of population (mortality and morbidity), health care system (public
or private), etc. Importantly, the country-xed e¤ects also capture the prevalence of
diseases that are relevant for treatment with anti-TNF drugs. For instance, the share of
the population with rheumatism is likely to vary across countries, but not over time within
a country. We use Norway as the reference country in the regressions.
From the descriptive statistics we saw that the consumption of anti-TNF drugs has
increased over time in all countries in our sample. To control for this we include a time
trend in the regression (ln t), and also allow for seasonal variations by dummies for quarter
(Qt). In this way we control for time variations in the consumption of anti-TNF drugs
that are common across countries and the three brands.
The regression model also includes a set of explanatory variables. First, we include
the (natural logarithm of) average price per DDD (lnPcit) of product i in country c at
time t. We expect the consumption to decrease in price, but the correlation might be
weak due to the presence of health insurance. Patients pay either no or only a marginal
fraction of the treatment cost of anti-TNF drug consumption, and are therefore not likely
to be particularly price responsive. However, insurers (third-party payers) may use various
measures, such as allocation of xed budgets to providers (hospitals or specialists) of anti-
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TNF treatments, to induce some price responsiveness on the utilization of the anti-TNF
brands.19 Insurers might also directly engage in price negotations with the pharmaceutical
producers or simply x the prices through regulation. Thus, we might observe some degree
of demand-side price elasticity for anti-TNF drugs.
Our estimate on the price elasticity can, however, be biased due to the standard endo-
geneity problem related to prices and demand being determined simultaneously. On one
hand, higher prices are expected to reduce demand, all else equal. On the other hand,
higher demand implies that rms can protably increase their prices. The estimate of
the price e¤ect on consumption of anti-TNF drugs is therefore likely to be downward bi-
ased. However, endogenity is not a crucial problem in our case, since the anti-TNF drug
market is expanding during the period and pharmaceutical rms face restrictions on price
increases.
Second, we use (the natural logarithm of) GDP per (10,000) capita (lnGDPct) for each
country c in each periode t as an explanatory variable. GDP per capita is a measure of
the average income level in each country. We expect a positive correlation between income
and consumption of anti-TNF drugs, but the income elasticity of demand might be weak
due to the presence of health insurance. On the other hand, the nancing of expensive
medicines, such as anti-TNF drugs, might be more generous in "richer" countries, i.e.,
countries with higher GPD per capita, which suggest that we might observe a positive
correlation between per-capita income and consumption.
Third, to control for health expenditures, we include a variable (HEct) measuring total
spending on health as a percentage of GDP. It is reasonable to expect a positive correlation
between total health expenditures and the consumption of anti-TNF drugs.20 Countries
that spends much on health in general are more likely to also spend more on anti-TNF
drugs, which in turn would lead to a higher consumption of these drugs. Both the income
19A recent study by Dalen et al. (2011) nds that a change in the nancing of anti-TNF drugs from cen-
tral government (social insurance agency) to public hospital enterprises induced a shift in the consumption
from the higher-priced Enbrel to the lower-priced Remicade. They argue this is due to the funding being
based on a xed hospital budget rather than regular social insurance payments with no expenditure caps.
20The anti-TNF drug expenditures are of course a part of the overall health expenditures, but the share
is negible, so including health expenditures as an explanatory variable should not involve any endogeneity
problems.
16
(GDP per capita) and the health expenditure (share of GDP) variables are common across
products, but vary over time and across countries.
Fourth, we include a variable (Iit) that measures the number of indications each of
the anti-TNF drugs are approved for by the European Medicines Agency (EMA). The
marketing authorizations with the approval dates were reported in Table 1 above. The
indication variable varies across products and over time, but is common across countries,
since the EMA approvals apply to all countries in our sample. We expect a positive
correlation between the number of approved indications and the consumption of anti-TNF
drugs.
Finally, the regression model includes an error term ("cit) that represents unobserved,
time-varying factors that a¤ect the consumption of anti-TNF drugs in the di¤erent coun-
tries. The error term is allowed to be correlated with the product- and country-specic
e¤ects, but not with other explanatory variables.
5 Results
Table 4 below reports the results from the regressions. To better understand the impact
of the di¤erent explanatory variables, we start out with estimating a model including
only country-specic e¤ects, product-specic e¤ects, and a time trend (model 1). Con-
sistent with the descriptive statistics, the regression results show substantial variation in
the per-capita consumption of anti-TNF drugs. We see that Norway, which is the base
country, has the highest consumption level among the countries in our sample. The per-
capita consumption in Norway is 173 percent higher than in Italy, which has the lowest
consumption level. The consumption of anti-TNF drugs tends to be higher in the Nordic
countries. However, there are large variations within this region, as well as between several
neighbouring countries, such as Italy and Spain.
The results also show the di¤erence in per-capita consumption across the three anti-
TNF brands. We see that Remicade has a substantially higher market share than Enbrel
and Humira. In model 1 the per-capita consumption of Remicade is estimated to be 74 and
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102 percent higher than Enbrel and Humira, respectively. These are the average gures
across all countries. The results also show a positive time trend, which is consistent with
the descriptive statistics reported in the previous section.
[ Table 4 about here ]
To explore the sources of the cross-country variation in the di¤usion of anti-TNF drugs,
we successively introduce the explanatory variables in the regression analysis. In model
2, we include prices and the number indication approvals. The results show that both
variables have the expected e¤ects. We see that the price elasticity is fairly low ( 0:44),
which seems reasonable due to the presence of health insurance, as discussed previously.
Considering indication approvals, the results show that an extra approval increases the
average per-capita consumption of anti-TNF drugs with almost 27 percent.
Although we nd that prices and indication approvals have signicant e¤ects on the
consumption levels of anti-TNF drugs, the cross-country di¤erences change only marginally
when we include these variables in the regression analysis. The number of indication ap-
provals vary across products, but are common to all countries, and are therefore not likely
to inuence the cross-country di¤erences in consumption of anti-TNF drugs. Moreover, we
observe from the descriptive statistics in Table 3 that the cross-country variation in prices
of the anti-TNF brands is fairly low, which suggests that including prices in the regressions
should not contribute much to explaining the cross-country variation in consumption.
Finally, in model 3, we include income (GDP per capita) and health expenditures
(health spending as a percentage of GDP) in the regression analysis.21 Both variables have
the expected e¤ects. The income elasticity is close to one ( 0:96), which seems reasonable
due to the presence of health insurance. The results also show that one percentage point
increase in the health expenditures (relative to GDP) increases the consumption of anti-
TNF drugs by 15 percent on average.
More interestingly, the results show that the inclusion of income and health expen-
21The descriptive statistics of these two variables can be found in Table A in the Appendix.
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ditures in the regression analysis has a signicant e¤ect on the estimated cross-country
di¤erences in the consumption of anti-TNF drugs. With the exception of Switzerland,
controlling for income and health expenditures reduces the cross-country variation in con-
sumption. The magnitude of these reductions vary across countries. For some countries,
such as Spain, Italy and Finland, the estimated consumption di¤erences relative to Norway
become substantially smaller. We also see that Sweden in fact has a higher consumption
than Norway when controlling for income and health expenditures. For other countries,
such as France and Germany, the reduction in the estimated consumption is more mar-
ginal. These ndings are consistent with the cross-country variation in income and health
expenditures, as reported in Table A in the Appendix.
However, there are still considerable di¤erences in consumption of anti-TNF drugs
across countries, as reected by the country dummy variables in model 3. In particular,
Germany, Switzerland and Italy have substantially lower consumption than Norway even
after controlling prices, income and health expenditures. There might be many country-
specic (time-invariant) factors that can explain the residual cross-country di¤erences.
One such factor could be the prevalence of diseases subject to medical treatment by anti-
TNF drugs. As mentioned above, rheumatism and psoriasis tend to be less frequent in
Southern European countries. This could partly explain why Italy has a low consumption
level, but does not explain the large di¤erence between Italy and Spain. The same argu-
ment applies to other neighbouring countries, such as Denmark and Norway, that have
signicant di¤erences in the per-capita consumption of anti-TNF drugs.
Another possible source for the observed cross-country variation in the di¤usion of
anti-TNF drugs can be the di¤erences in the funding schemes. The countries in our
sample vary according to whether the pharmaceutical expenditures are nanced through
taxation or social insurance contributions. They also vary according to whether insurance
is provided publicly (by the state) or privately. The results show that there is a tendency
that countries with social insurance schemes and private provision, such as Germany and
Switzerland, have a lower consumption of anti-TNF drugs than countries that base the
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funding on taxation, with the exception of Italy.
There are also di¤erences according to the regulatory schemes. The strictness in the
price control should be captured by the price variable included in the regression analysis
(model 2 and 3). However, there are other regulatory instruments that may a¤ect the
di¤usion of new medicines, such as the criteria for inclusion on the reimbursement list,
medical guidelines, or other measures that inuence the utilization of anti-TNF drugs.
Such information is hard to obtain for specic drug therapies. However, if the regulatory
schemes are fairly constant over time, the country-specic e¤ects would capture the impact
of di¤erent schemes.
6 Concluding remarks
Di¤usion of new medicines is important for pharmaceutical rms prots, but also for
patientsaccess to new medical treatments. In this paper we have studied the cross-country
di¤usion of anti-TNF drugs across a set of European countries from the rst launch in
2000 until becoming blockbusters in 2009. To examine the cross-country consumption
patterns, we have made use of a data set with detailed product-level information about
the sales of the three anti-TNF brands Remicade, Enbrel and Humira.
The descriptive statistics showed substantial growth in the per-capita consumption of
the anti-TNF drugs in all countries over the sample period, but revealed also very large
variation across countries. Interestingly, the consumption di¤erences between neighbour-
ing countries, such as Spain and Italy or Norway and Denmark, were large. In order
to explore the sources of the cross-country variation in the consumption of anti-TNF
drugs, we estimated several multivariate regression models. We found that time-invariant
country-specic factors (e.g., disease prevalence, demographics, health care system, etc.)
explained substantial parts of the cross-country variation in consumption, but the residual
di¤erences were still large.
We therefore successively introduced sets of explanatory variables. First, we included
prices and the number of approved indications for each of the three anti-TNF drugs in
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the di¤erent countries. Both variables had the expected e¤ects on the per-capita con-
sumption, but did not inuence the cross-country di¤erences in consumption. Second, we
included income (GDP per capita) and health expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) as
explanatory variables. These variables inuenced the cross-country di¤erences. With the
exception of Switzerland, controlling for income and health expenditures led to a reduction
in the di¤erences in per-capita consumption across countries. The remaining cross-country
variation is therefore likely to be explained by unobserved factors that might have been
changing over time, such as, for instance, medical guidelines, funding schemes, or market-
ing strategies by the pharmaceutical rms. We leave these issues to future research.
7 Appendix
[ Insert Table A about here ]
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Indication approvals and marketing authorizations for anti-TNF drugs by EMA. 
 
Indications 
Date of issue of marketing authorization 
Remicade 
(infliximab) 
Enbrel 
(etanercept) 
Humira 
(adalimumab) 
Crohn’s disease 13 August 1999 - 4 June 2007 
Rheumatoid arthritis 27 June 2000 3 February 2000 8 September 2003 
Ankylosing spondylitis 15 May 2003 16 January 2004 1 June 2006 
Psoriatic arthritis 24 September 2004 5 December 2002 1 August 2005 
Plaque psoriasis 29 September 2005 24 September 2004 19 December 2007 
Ulcerative colitis 28 February 2006 - - 
Juvenile idiopathic arthritis - 3 February 2000 25 August 2008 
 
Table 2. Prescriptions, dispending channels and funding of anti-TNF drugs across countries, 2010 (IMS Health). 
 Anti-TNF drug Prescribers Dispensing channels Funding Copayment 
Denmark Remicade Hospital specialists Hospitals Regional government funds No 
 Enbrel Community dermatologists Hospitals and pharmacies Regional government funds Marginal (<1%) 
 Humira Community dermatologists Hospitals and pharmacies Regional government funds Marginal (<1%) 
Finland Remicade Hospital specialists Hospitals Central government (social 
insurance institute) 
No 
 Enbrel Rheumatologists Pharmacies Central government (social 
insurance institute) 
Marginal (4%) 
 Humira Rheumatologists Pharmacies Central government (social 
insurance institute) 
Marginal (4%) 
France Remicade Hospital specialists Hospitals National Health Service No 
 Enbrel Private specialists Pharmacies National Health Service No 
 Humira Private specialists Pharmacies National Health Service No 
Germany Remicade Hospitals and private specialists Hospitals and pharmacies Health insurance organizations 
and private insurance funds 
No 
 Enbrel Hospitals and private specialists Pharmacies Health insurance organizations 
and private insurance funds 
No 
 Humira Hospitals and private specialists Pharmacies Health insurance organizations 
and private insurance funds 
No 
Italy Remicade Hospital specialists Hospitals Regional government with 
national subsidy 
No 
 Enbrel Hospital specialists Hospitals and pharmacies Regional government with 
national subsidy 
No 
 Humira Hospital specialists Hospitals and pharmacies Regional government with 
national subsidy 
No 
Norway Remicade Hospital specialists Hospitals Central government No 
 Enbrel Hospital and private specialists Hospitals and pharmacies Central government No 
 Humira Hospital and private specialists Hospitals and pharmacies Central government No 
Spain Remicade Hospital specialists Hospitals Central government No 
 Enbrel Hospital specialists Hospitals Central government No 
 Humira Hospital specialists Hospitals Central government No 
Sweden Remicade Hospital specialists Hospitals and pharmacies Regional government with 
national subsidy 
No 
 Enbrel Hospital specialists Hospitals and pharmacies Regional government with 
national subsidy 
Marginal (<1%) 
 Humira Hospital specialists Hospitals and pharmacies Regional government with 
national subsidy 
Marginal (<1%) 
Switzerland Remicade Hospital and private specialists Hospital, pharmacy and self-
dispensing doctors 
Health insurance funds Marginal  
 Enbrel Hospitals and private specialists Hospital, pharmacy and self-
dispensing doctors 
Health insurance funds Marginal 
 Humira Hospitals and private specialists Hospital, pharmacy and self-
dispensing doctors 
Health insurance funds Marginal 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics. 
Country  Molecule Drug In the data 
set 
Average price 
(national 
currency) 
Average price 
(EURO) 
Average  DDD 
per month 
Average DDD per 1000 
inhabitants (per 
month) 
Proportion 
hospital sales 
Proportion 
parallel 
import 
Norway (hospital and retail data) INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Jan 2000 156.63 19.37 76715.77 164.29 0.76 0 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Oct 2002 297.59 36.59 34582.32 73.53 0.02 0 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL Jan 2000 295.77 36.63 64286.31 137.78 0.01 0 
  ALL DRUGS - 245.66 30.40 166074.30 355.38 0.29 0 
Sweden (combined data only) INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Jan 2000 185.72 19.96 125377.80 138.34 - 0 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Sep 2003 382.66 40.41 61073.32 66.82 - 0 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL May 2000 368.67 39.58 81710.46 89.82 - 0.01 
  ALL DRUGS - 295.05 31.68 243044.30 267.48 - 0.003 
Denmark (combined data only) INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Jan 2000 156.68 21.04 56063.78 102.93 - 0 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Oct 2003 319.31 42.86 39790.71 72.78 - 0 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL Jul 2003 308.26 41.38 36438.28 66.75 - 0 
  ALL DRUGS - 222.96 29.94 104617.80 191.80 - 0 
Finland (hospital and retail data) INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Jan 2000 20.62 20.62 41948.44 79.74 1.00 0 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Mar 2004 38.71 38.71 37808.08 71.51 0.03 0 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL Jun 2000 39.13 39.13 26413.42 50.05 0.29 0 
  ALL DRUGS - 31.24 31.24 89316.01 169.42 0.51 0 
Germany (hospital and retail data) 
 
INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Jan 2000 22.48 22.48 238780.93 29.01 0.24 0.05 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Sep 2003 52.82 52.82 269399.60 32.77 0.01 0.10 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL May 2003 46.78 46.78 242120.43 29.42 0.01 0.10 
  ALL DRUGS - 37.65 37.65 641432.70 77.96 0.10 0.08 
France (hospital and retail data) 
 
INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Jan 2000 24.26 24.26 384132.40 60.65 1.00 0 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Jul 2003 41.74 41.74 219419.11 34.43 0.29 0 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL Jan 2000 32.91 32.91 227589.25 35.87 0.37 0 
  ALL DRUGS - 31.40 31.40 754344.40 118.90 0.59 0 
Spain (hospital and retail data) INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Jan 2000 20.82 20.82 277832.93 63.15 1.00 0 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Mar 2004 37.53 37.53 189223.02 42.13 1.00 0 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL Apr 2001 33.41 33.41 258574.59 57.77 0.91 0 
  ALL DRUGS - 28.52 28.52 614465.70 138.29 0.97 0 
Italy (hospital and retail data) 
 
INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Apr 2000 18.26 18.26 232429.55 39.43 1.00 0 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Jul 2004 34.36 34.36 141886.17 23.88 1.00 0 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL May 2001 34.51 34.51 180303.32 30.43 1.00 0 
  ALL DRUGS - 27.15 27.15 460918.90 77.95 1.00 0 
Switzerland (hospital and retail 
data) 
INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Mar 2000 36.54 23.70 54417.17 72.38 0.84 0 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Jul 2003 59.88 38.26 38921.66 51.46 0.08 0 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL Jan 2000 57.56 37.29 22415.71 29.77 0.32 0 
  ALL DRUGS - 50.03 32.38 101225.00 134.39 0.45 0 
 
Tabell 4. Regression results, consumption of anti-TNF drugs (DDD per 10,000 capita). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Number of indication approvals - 0.269*** (0.013) 0.227*** (0.012) 
Ln price - -0.442*** (0.134) -0.393*** (0.132) 
Ln GDP per capita - - 0.963*** (0.256) 
Ln health spending as percentage of GDP - - 0.154*** (0.032) 
Base: Remicade    
Enbrel -0.742*** (0.027) -0.535*** (0.079) -0.554*** (0.078) 
Humira -1.024*** (0.028) -0.405*** (0.088) -0.496*** (0.084) 
Base: Norway    
France -1.209*** (0.048) -1.190*** (0.046) -1.055*** (0.113) 
Sweden -0.144*** (0.050) -0.124*** (0.049) 0.189* (0.101) 
Denmark -0.630*** (0.047) -0.601*** (0.047) -0.422*** (0.091) 
Finland -0.777*** (0.052) -0.764*** (0.049) -0.240* (0.129) 
Germany -1.496*** (0.046) -1.399*** (0.059) -1.280*** (0.112) 
Italy -1.731*** (0.055) -1.765*** (0.050) -1.229*** (0.158) 
Spain -1.137*** (0.054) -1.145*** (0.048) -0.496*** (0.158) 
Switzerland -1.210*** (0.052) -1.177*** (0.054) -1.286*** (0.081) 
Time trend (ln periode) 1.210*** (0.029) 0.782*** (0.036) 0.654*** (0.055) 
Base: First quarter     
Second quarter 0.009 (0.033) 0.032 (0.029) 0.047* (0.029) 
Third quarter -0.041 (0.032) -0.027 (0.028) 0.005 (0.028) 
Forth quarter -0.013 (0.029) -0.001 (0.027) 0.047* (0.028) 
Constant 0.297** (0.132) 2.268*** (0.411) -0.136 (0.568) 
R2 0.772 0.821 0.824 
Observations 2744 2744 2744 
 
Tabell A.1. Descriptive statistics GDP and total health expenses 
 GDP (per 10.000 
inhabitants) 
Total health 
expenses as 
percentage of GDP 
Norway 4.058 (0.757) 9.150 (0.549) 
Sweden 2.951 (0.399) 9.080 (0.424) 
Denmark 2.967 (0.360) 9.780 (0.725) 
Finland 2.739 (0.376) 8.130 (0.537) 
Germany 2.773 (0.380) 10.680 (0.338) 
France 2.647 (0.270) 10.870 (0.470) 
Italy 2.532 (0.219) 8.670 (0.423) 
Spain 2.397 (0.344) 8.180 (0.727) 
Switzerland 3.413 (0.379) 10.900 (0.372) 
 
 
Figure 1. Consumption levels in DDD per capita. 
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Figure 2. Prices per DDD in Euros.  
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